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Almost a decade after the financial crisis of 2007-8, the European Left is still trying to 
articulate a new narrative that will make it relevant for the twenty-first century. The 
crisis revealed the inequalities embedded in the European project and the structural 
deficiencies of the common currency, which ultimately divide the ‘Northern’ countries 
from the ‘Southern’ and put in question the democratic nature of the Union. The 
prosperity of Germany and the elevation of its Finance Minister, Wolfgang Schäuble, 
to de facto pan-European finance minister devoted to imposing austerity across 
Europe, a failed remedy for the smaller, indebted partners such as Greece, Spain 
and Italy – all this dispelled any hope for a ‘social’ Europe. The increasing gap 
between the beneficiaries of globalization and neoliberalism and those ‘left behind’, 
the increasingly insecure employment market where labour rights are constantly 
under attack and they are treated as the concessions of a benevolent philanthropist - 
concessions that can be withdrawn at any time – all this divided national populations 
beyond the traditional class bases. Divisions between the young and the older, 
between those living in the metropolitan centres and those in the countryside, 
between the university educated and those with no qualifications, between ‘citizens’ 
and migrants, complicate the picture even further. Economic divisions and cultural 
divisions have now created a complex environment, fertile for extreme right-wing, 
regressive forces across Europe. Movements and parties with an inclusive, 
egalitarian agenda could be the opposition to both the ascendancy of the extreme 
right and to the neoliberal austerity agenda, and provide a vision of unity in Europe. 
Yet, they still seem unable to halt this regression, unable to traverse the grievances 
of those watching in horror the attack on established rights and to organise a 
common front across Europe.  
 
In this environment, the division between the traditional Left and Right is being 
redefined according to the grain of the political culture of each country. As the Right 
(and far-Right) are in many countries in the process of redefining themselves as 
opponents of the neo-liberalism they have been vigorously imposing for over thirty 
years, in favour of a new ‘national, interventionist conservatism’ (the British 
Conservatives are a good example), the Left is exploring the relationship with 
grassroots movements and left populism. Indeed, ‘movement’ and ‘populism’ are the 
new catch phrases of the Left. The only problem is that, more often than not, the 
appropriation of these terms as a panacea for the Left comes with crude theoretical 
and political simplifications that undermine their usefulness. We would therefore like 
to problematise what are the challenges for left populism, focusing on the 
relationship between parties and movements and on the drawing of new antagonistic 
frontiers within diverse contexts across Europe today.  
 
Time for a Populist, Left Intervention 
The success of neoliberalism for the past thirty years was to a great extent possible 
due to what has been termed ‘the post-democratic condition’. On the one hand, ‘the 
peoples’ of Europe had been excluded from democratic decision making at national 
and transnational level. On the other hand, the neoliberal technocracy - domestic 
and European – displacement of economics from the realm of politics came to its 
head with the 2008 crisis: a crisis that no ‘expert’ predicted despite revealing deep 
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structural problems in the banking and financial sector that was, ultimately, left intact 
apart from the impoverishment of huge numbers of people in Europe and abroad. 
The consensus over neoliberal policies and the foreclosure of any alternative – 
TINA: There Is No Alternative - has been safeguarded by technocratic experts 
interpreting the norms of economics in accordance with the neoliberal consensus 
even after the crisis.  
 
The persistence of this post-democratic condition, and the particular form it takes, 
can be exemplifies in the framing of the negotiations between Greece and the Troika 
(IMF, ECB, EC) in 2015 and the Brexit debates in 2016-17. 
 
In terms of Greece, the crisis revealed the structural inequalities inscribed in the 
Eurozone project, which enabled the financial sector to survive unscattered, while 
the people of Southern Europe and, especially, Greece still suffer the results of 
extreme austerity, unsustainable debt and impoverishment. The recognition of the 
catastrophic effects of neoliberal policies are still far from recognised as such despite 
the clear indications. Instead, the frame of ‘household’ economics (‘if you have 
borrowed too much on your credit card, you’ll have to cut your expenses until you 
pay it off’) persists as much as it did during the 2015 negotiations between the 
Syriza-ANEL government and the Troika as it does now, two years on. In the case of 
Greece, the conflation of macro- with micro-economics allowed the representation of 
the country as an exception, it alone responsible for its structural weakness to 
compete in a globalised, neoliberal economy. But the consequences of this narrative 
extended beyond Greece. Moral claims around issues of debt, expenditure and 
investment1 continued to support the further privatisations and deregulation of 
domestic labour markets,2 but now coupled with a return to a nationalist, regressive 
discourse adopted by Brexit Britain and Trump’s presidency. 
 
In Britain, during the referendum campaign, the Remain side emphasized the 
economic consequences of a leave result, but, more often than not, by advocating 
the same neoliberal principles that had alienated big parts of the population. It was 
met by a Leave discourse that anchored its economic arguments not in a challenge 
to neoliberal politics, but in the double call for further deregulation and prioritisation 
of the national agenda. When Dominic Cummings, a leading figure of the Leave 
campaign explained his post-Brexit vision, he characteristically imagined Britain ‘not 
being bound by all the ludicrous rules of the EU, you can make yourself a centre 
where the people who want to lead technological revolutions come to work, because 
we’ve got huge assets there. We’ve got the City of London. We’re free of the EU 
regulatory horror. We can move extremely quickly.’3 The images of the sovereign 
individual and the sovereign nation converged in this discourse. 
 
The success of this discourse rested, on the one hand, on a ‘common sense’ 
understanding that less restrictions will allow unrestrained trade deals between the 
                                                          
1 For a more detailed discussion on neoliberal hegemony, see Doreen Massey (2015) ‘Vocabularies 
of the Economy’, in Stuart Hall, Doreen Massey and Michael Rustin (eds.) After Neoliberalism - The 
Kilburn Manifesto, pp. 24-36, London: Lawrence and Wishart. 
2 Marina Prentoulis (2016) ‘The Greek Crisis: Post-democratic logic in Action’, in Adam Hug (ed) 
Europe and the People, pp. 29-31, London: Foreign Policy Centre. 
3 Bagehot, (2016) ‘An Interview with Dominic Cummings’, The Economist, 21 January 2016, available 
at http://www.economist.com/blogs/bagehot/2016/01/out-campaign, accessed 19 February 2017,. 
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EU and other partners such as the US. It did find fertile soil especially among those 
outside the metropolitan centres who did not benefit from globalisation and had been 
impoverished by thirty years of neoliberalism embraced by successive Tory and 
Labour governments alike. What is interesting here is that neither the neoliberal 
direction of the EU political establishment nor the national neoliberal agenda were 
put into question. Instead, frames with more immediate resonance, such as 
immigration, were used successfully by right-wing populists dominating the public 
debate and the mainstream media panels.  
 
Assisted  by an unconscious nostalgia for the Imperial past of Great Britain, a past 
when ‘Britishness’ dominated (literally) and had brought to submission the colonial 
‘others’, the Leave discourse resonated with voters in every little English town, 
migrant presence or not. Just like the electorally more successful Marine Le Pen in 
France, Nigel Farage and the Tory Leavers promised to liberate us from these 
‘others’, those being the obstacle to our national identity: from the EU, from 
globalisation, from Muslim immigrants and, in Britain above all, from the EU nationals 
taking British jobs and becoming a burden on the British welfare state. 
 
If the political terrain was ripe for a populist intervention in both Greece and Britain, 
what were the conditions that differentiated the successful type of populist discourse 
– left in one case, right in the other? We think the answer has to be traced in the first 
instance to the social movements, or their absence, that preceded the populist 
parties, and, in the second instance, the ability of a populist political movement to 
‘transverse’ the terms of the old political landscape and create new antagonisms and 
new points of identification.   
 
Dislocation, Grassroots Movements and Different Social Sites 
The economic crisis in Greece and Spain, and the rapid and severe pauperization of 
parts of the population that up to that point felt secure in a relative prosperity, led to 
the grassroots demonstrations known as ‘indignants’ (Aganaktismenoi/Indignados). 
As the previous political affiliations of diverse groups of people in the two countries 
were loosened, they joined together in these inclusive movements, which broke the 
identification with previous political labels. It was indeed this ability of the movements 
to speak in a way so as to embrace a diversity of grievances beyond the traditional 
confines of left/right politics that allowed them to play a decisive role in shaping 
future of politics of the two countries.4 In the first instance, scholars proclaimed these 
protests to be ‘horizontalist’ experiments of ‘direct democracy’, resisting the 
verticality of representational politics. Elsewhere, we have argued that there is no 
horizontality without verticality, and that attempts to build horizontalism always retain 
some element of representation.5 
 
There is something more at stake here, however, significant for our understanding of 
the relationship between populist parties and movements, and this has to do with the 
                                                          
4 For Greece, see for example Dimitrios Theodossopoulos (2014) ‘The Poetics of Indignation in 
Greece: Anti-austerity Protests and Accountability’, in Pnina Werbner, Martin Webb and Kathryn 
Spellman-Poots (eds.), The Political Aesthetics of Global Protest: The Arab Spring and beyond, pp. 
368-88, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. For Spain, see Carlos Delclós (2015) Hope is a 
Promise: From the Indignados to the Rise of Podemos in Spain, London: Zed Books. 
5 Marina Prentoulis and Lasse Thomassen (2013) ‘Political Theory In the Square: Protest, 
Representation and Subjectification’, Contemporary Political Theory 12:3, 166-84. 
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kind of demands made by the movements of the indignants. Many of those demands 
were anti-system, sometimes against the political parties, sometimes against the 
political system as a whole; sometimes against the capitalist system or key parts of it 
(financial institutions, above all), and sometimes just against ‘the system’ as such 
without specifying what it might mean. Other demands are not immediately anti-
system. They are particular demands about this or that public policy or law, or about 
grievances that people experience in their everyday lives: the mortgage system, the 
closure of the local post office, and so on. 
 
What we have found is that, for something like a left populist movement to gain 
traction, it is necessary to connect the anti-system demands with the particular 
demands. Thereby the particular demands become politicised and radicalised, 
because they become framed as anti-system demands: the closure of the local post 
office becomes a sign of some bigger malaise of the political or economic system. 
But it always works the other way around: as demands against the system become 
concretised in particular demands, the populist anti-system discourse becomes 
tangible and meaningful, and can then reach wider sections of the population. This 
kind of discourse only works if it is at once abstract – ‘anti-system’ and very concrete 
– relating to people’s everyday lives. 
 
Now, consider the cases of Occupy London, the Aganaktismenoi in Greece and the 
Indignados in Spain. In the case of Occupy London, nothing happened: the demands 
of the movement remained anti-system, and they were left there. They did not 
manage to become widely accepted by articulating together diverse grievances, 
grievances which talk to people’s everyday experience.. In the case of Greece and 
Spain (and in the lesser well-known case of Slovenia), the demands were 
transformed as they were articulated by SYRIZA and Podemos, first, within the 
mainstream mediascape and, later, within political institutions. As a result, they were 
no longer simply anti-system marginal demands but contesters of power aiming to 
take on and change the system. The transformation of demands requires work on 
both sides: both within the movements and within the parties operating in a different 
terrain. And in this process, the articulation of concrete demands with a populist 
frontier between ‘the people’ and ‘the system’ is essential. This is what happened in 
Greece and Spain (and Slovenia), but not in Britain. 
 
The potential transformative ability of the activists and the movements rested on their 
capacity to move from one social site to another.6 In the case of Greece, after the 
movements receded, part of the grassroots activity was channelled into the creation 
of ‘solidarity networks’. In Spain, part of grassroots activity was channelled into local 
politics that transformed the municipalities of, for example, Barcelona (Barcelona en 
Comú) and Madrid (Ahora Madrid). Moving to the site of electoral politics, through 
Syriza and Podemos, was the attempt to articulate the demands of the ‘people’, or 
parts of it, into an equivalential chain, and make them the contesters of a new type of 
politics. The trajectory of Syriza and Podemos was not similar: Syriza pre-existed the 
2011 indignant movements as a small electoral coalition of left organisations, 
actively supporting the participation in social movements. Podemos, which only 
                                                          
6 Marina Prentoulis and Lasse Thomassen (2014) ‘Autonomy and Hegemony in the Squares: The 
2011 Protests in Greece and Spain’, in Alexandros Kioupkiolos and Giorgos Katsambekis (eds.), 
Radical Democracy and Collective Movements Today: The Biopolitics of the Multitude versus the 
Hegemony of the People, pp. 213-34, Farnham: Ashgate, p. 228. 
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emerged in 2014 is the product of the movements, and that may be part of why it 
resisted labelling themselves as ‘left’. What is important to emphasise here is that 
the articulatory practice starts on one site, that of the movement, and then moves to 
another, that of electoral politics. 
 
In Britain, we have a different political trajectory. The two moments in 2011 
questioning the political system, the London Riots and the Occupy London Stock 
Exchange protests, did not manage to bring together different demands or to extend 
discontent beyond particular sectors of the population. The London riots in August 
2011 were set in motion by the police shooting of 29-year-old Mark Duggan. The 
initially peaceful march to the Tottenham police station soon sparked riots across 
many districts in and outside London. The looting and violence and the absence of 
clear demands obscured the root causes of the events and the anger accumulated 
by British communities that had been victimised, marginalised and excluded from the 
benefits of globalization for decades. 
 
The Occupy movement born in the US in the summer of 2011 had a global appeal 
and defined themselves as leaderless and party-less.7 Despite its contribution on the 
grassroots level, in Britain it failed to generate a widespread response that would 
transform electoral politics. One possible contributing factor is that the financial crisis 
had not produced the same dislocatory effect on the British working and middle-
classes, and, as such, they still identified with the institutions – including the political 
parties – of the existing economic and political system. As a result, Occupy failed to 
bring together diverse and wider sections of the population. 
 
Instead, the ‘movement’ that promised to challenge electoral politics in Britain was 
Momentum: the organization built out of the Jeremy Corbyn campaign for the 
leadership of the Labour Party in 2015. The aim of the organization is ‘to increase 
participatory democracy, solidarity, and grassroots power and help Labour become 
the transformative governing party of the 21st century’.8 Many things can be said 
about the internal debates and organisational structures of Momentum, and it is 
worth attention in its own right as a different attempt to intervene in electoral politics. 
Nevertheless, Momentum remained confined to the narrower sphere of Labour 
politics, and it failed to generate a wider social interest despite its impressive 
membership. As we will argue in the next part, this is coupled with the inability of the 
Labour Party, and the Corbyn leadership in particular, to deal with the rupture 
created by the British EU referendum. 
 
To sum up, the potential for a left populist intervention rests in the first instance on 
the dislocation of previous political affiliations and identities, a dislocation that may 
be manifested as grassroots level. When these dislocated identities are then 
articulated by social movements, and when the anti-system demands are connected 
to concrete, everyday grievances, we have the possibility for the emergence of 
populist parties. 
 
Beyond Left and Right? 
                                                          
7 http://occupylondon.org.uk/about/ 
8 http://www.peoplesmomentum.com/ 
6 
 
Usually we divide parties into left and right plus its many combinations of centre, 
centre-left, centre-right, far left and far right. Parties place themselves on the left-
right axis, and so do voters who will identify themselves as left or right or centre. This 
creates a challenge to any populist left party. The experiences of Podemos in Spain, 
SYRIZA in Greece and the United Left in Slovenia show that there is not a single 
correct road to be taken. 
 
In Spain, the Indignados refused to be labelled a movement of the Left. When they 
proclaimed ‘They don’t represent us!’, they referred to the parties of the Left as well 
as the Right. And so, when Podemos was created three years ago in 2014, they tried 
to go beyond left and right. Not in the way of Blair’s, Clinton’s and Schröder’s ‘the 
third way’, which was an attempt to place themselves in the middle and optimise 
electorally. For Podemos, it was not a question of moving a bit to the left or a bit to 
the right; doing so would just reinforce the left-right terms of Spanish politics. 
Instead, they sought to disrupt the way in which Spanish people thought about 
politics, and the way in which voters identified themselves. They did so by 
introducing a new axis or division: between above and below, between the 
establishment (la casta) and the people. All the old parties – left or right – were 
placed in the category of the establishment together with the banks and other 
economic elites. Below, as part of the people, were ordinary Spanish folks. 
 
Podemos saw very well that, if they had to change Spanish politics, and if they had 
to have a chance of winning elections, they could not do so from a position on the 
Left. They would be squeezed between the centre-left socialist party (PSOE) and the 
old left in Izquierda Unida (IU). At most, they would be able to take some voters from 
PSOE’s left flank and a few voters from IU’s right flank. By moving from the left-right 
axis to the establishment-the people axis, Podemos would have the people all to 
themselves. They would become the representative of the people, and the old 
parties would gradually become irrelevant.9 
  
This is what, in Podemos, they call transversality. Transversality is really about 
changing the rules of the political game. Where before Spanish politics was a 
question of left or right, it now became a question of establishment or the people. Put 
differently, transversality is about changing the terms of what we are struggling about 
and for – and making sure that those terms favour the way we see the world. In the 
case of populism, transversality involves articulating an antagonistic frontier. The 
antagonism can be between any two poles: the people vs the establishment, the 
people vs the EU, the nation vs immigrants, left vs right, and so forth. In the case of 
Podemos, they managed to articulate a new antagonism (the people vs the 
establishment) in place of the old one between left and right. 
 
In Spain, the success of Podemos’ transversality was undermined, among other 
things, by the emergence of the centre-right liberal Ciudadanos party. Although 
much less successful than Podemos, Ciudadanos were, like Podemos, the new kids 
on the block. And like Podemos, they were happy for Spanish politics to no longer be 
a matter of left or right, but a matter of, if not above and below, then at least old and 
                                                          
9 For good introductions to Podemos as a form of left-wing populism, see Pablo Iglesias (2015) 
‘Understanding Podemos’, New Left Review 93 (May-June), 7-22; and Alexandros Kioupkiolis (2016) 
‘Podemos: The ambiguous Promises of Left-Wing Populism in Spain’, Journal of Political Ideologies 
21:2, 99-120. 
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new. In other words, Ciudadanos was able to play on the terrain opened up by 
Podemos because they were a new party. (Strictly speaking, they were not a new 
party, but until then they had only had limited success and only in Catalonia.) 
Disaffected right-wing and centre-right voters now had a place to go to without 
having to go to Podemos. Podemos’s success in realigning Spanish politics along a 
new axis thus also made it possible for other parties to take advantage of this 
realignment. 
 
In Greece, SYRIZA took a different path. The main faction within SYRIZA was the 
product of KKE-es (Communist Party of Greece-Interior), who split from the KKE 
(Communist Party of Greece) in 1968 following a Eurocommunist trajectory. In the 
1990s, part of KKE-es was incorporated into the electoral coalition Συνασπισμος της 
Αριστερας και της Προοδου (Coalition of the Left and Progress) which in 2004, 
together with other left extra-parliamentary organisations, formed SYRIZA. The 
historical roots of SYRIZA were thus always associated with the Left, but a radical, 
democratic Left in favour of broader coalitions and actively engaged in social 
movements.10 Indeed, prior to the emergence of Podemos, Izquierda Unida were the 
natural allies of SYRIZA in Spain as far as left alliances go; beyond that, IU chose 
not to engage with the new movements in the way that SYRIZA did. 
 
By 2010, the financial crisis had significantly increased the Greek sovereign debt. 
The PASOK (centre, socialist) government accepted the unprecedented austerity 
part of the bailout agreement (the so-called memorandum) proposed by IMF, ECB 
and EC as sovereign debt started to reach unrealistic levels. The indignant 
movement expressed the anti-establishment sentiment, and, by the time of the 2012 
election, both mainstream parties, New Democracy (centre right) and PASOK, had 
lost most of their share of the vote. A new element was now added to the 
antagonistic frontier articulated by the indignants movement between the people and 
the establishment: the memorandum. The memorandum became a sign that the 
political establishment had sold the people; the establishment became defined as 
those who signed the memorandum, with the indignants and SYRIZA opposing it. 
(Of course, later that changed when the SYRIZA-led government was forced to 
accept the memorandum.)  SYRIZA, actively involved in the indignant movement, 
against the austerity measures imposed on Greece and ‘anti-establishment’11 
managed to hijack the centre and centre-left vote. SYRIZA transversed the old left-
right axis of Greek politics in two ways in particular. First, because they became the 
primary voice of opposition towards the old elites and the austerity imposed by the 
Troika; and, second, because they were able to connect together a variety of 
demands – of working class sectors, ‘educated employees in the public sector, 
professionals and small employees’12 – in order to come to power. SYRIZA remains 
associated with the Left, but this association has not stood in the way of gaining 
government power. 
 
                                                          
10 Myrto Tsakatika and Costas Eleftheriou (2013) ‘The Radical Left’s Turn towards Civil Society in 
Greece: One Strategy, Two Paths’, South European Society and Politics, 18:1, 81-99. 
11 For a good introduction to SYRIZA as a form of left-wing populism, see Yannis Stavrakakis and 
Giorgos Katsambekis, ‘Left-wing populism in the European periphery: the case of SYRIZA’, Journal of 
Political Ideologies, 19:2 (2014): 119-42. 
12 Costas Vernardakis (2012) Political Parties, Elections and Party System. The Transformation of 
Political Representation 1990-2010 (in Greek), Athens: Sakkoulas. 
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In Slovenia, the United Left self-identified as left and socialist from the beginning, 
and it continues to do so.13 Like SYRIZA and Podemos, they rose to prominence on 
the back of the financial crisis and a crisis of representation and social protest. And, 
like SYRIZA and Podemos, the United Left struggle with the tensions between 
horizontalist activist practices and the more vertical structures of the political system. 
Unlike SYRIZA and Podmeos, however, they have not appropriated a populist 
discourse, and so far they have only made relatively small electoral gains, achieving 
six percent and six seats in the 2014 parliamentary elections. 
 
As the experiences of Spain, Greece and Slovenia show, there is no one-size-fits-all 
answer to what a radical left party should do in order to gain electoral support. Syriza 
and the Slovenian United Left self-identify as left; in electoral terms, one has been 
successful, the other less so. In one case, the party appropriated a populist 
discourse and articulated new antagonisms (the people vs the establishment, the 
people vs the memorandum, the new vs the old); in the other case, the party did not 
take a populist turn. Podemos chose the road of transversal populism and rejected 
the Left label. Nonetheless, most people in Spain identify them as to the left, 
somewhere between PSOE and IU. This has been helped by the old political class 
and the mainstream media who have not hesitated to shout that the commies are 
coming (again). Despite their efforts to the contrary, Podemos has not been wholly 
successful in transversing the old left-right axis, which continues to shape Spanish 
politics to a significant degree.  
 
In 2016, Podemos created an electoral alliance with Izquierda Unida for the general 
election in June. The electoral system favours the biggest parties, and the thinking 
was that the electoral alliance would optimise the number of seats in parliament. 
Although the new alliance – Unidos Podemos – increased their number of seats by 
two, the results were disappointing. Compared to the combined total of Podemos 
and IU votes in the 2015 general election, Unidos Podemos lost more than a million 
votes. 
 
The question was if Podemos should opt for a more transversal strategy, or if they 
should present themselves as a party of the Left. How do you maximise your 
electoral support: do you aim for a thin slice of the whole electorate, or for a big slice 
of the Left electorate? There is no way of deciding for sure if the poor results were a 
result of the alliance with IU. The alliance was heavily disputed within Podemos 
though, dividing the party’s leader, Pablo Iglesias, and its number two, Íñigo Errejón. 
For the Errejonistas, the alliance was a mistake because it locked Podemos into the 
Left, thereby limiting its transversal potential. For the Pablistas, the transversal 
strategy had failed because Podemos had not overtaken PSOE. They might also 
point out that Podemos is anyway associated with the Left in most people’s minds, 
so they might as well show the flag. The trouble is that this realigns Spanish politics 
back to where it was: left versus right. And the equivocation over how to identify 
themselves – as left, or as neither left nor right – makes Podemos look inauthentic: 
inauthentically left and inauthentically transversal at one and the same time. 
 
                                                          
13 Alen Toplišek (2017) ‘The Slovenian United Left: From Protest to Movement, and From Movement 
to Party’, openDemocracy, 19 January 2017, available at https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-
europe-make-it/alen-topli-ek/slovenian-united-left-from-protest-to-movement-and-from-movement-to, 
accessed 20 February 2017. 
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Neither transversality nor populism is simply a matter of realigning politics from left-
right to the people vs the establishment. It can take many different forms. In the UK, 
Brexit has realigned British politics along a division between Leavers and 
Remainers. The Conservatives and Labour are divided down the middle over Brexit. 
The Conservatives have overwhelmingly gone for Leave; Labour equivocates. The 
discussion over article 50, the starting of the Brexit process is a good example. The 
Labour leadership, in order to avoid being branded as ‘the enemy of the people’ 
(those who will go against the will of the referendum), decided to vote in favour of 
triggering article 50. This despite the fact that so far the form Brexit will take had 
been defined by the Conservative government according to the lines of a ‘hard’ 
Brexit. (A ‘soft’ Brexit’ would potentially involve membership of the single market and, 
as a result, fewer border restrictions than Prime Minister Teresa May has promised.) 
In order to compel Labour MPs to vote for article 50, the leadership imposed a three 
line whip (enforcing MPs vote with the line of the party), which put some Labour MPs 
from Remain constituencies at odds with their electorate. Furthermore, the attempts 
of Labour, SNP (Scottish National Party), Greens and Liberal-Democrats to pass the 
Bill with some amendments that would ‘soften’ Brexit and make a vote in the British 
parliament a meaningful one (before the negotiations between the UK and the EU 
get to their final stages) were all rejected. Now it remains to be seen if the unelected 
House of Lords can pass some amendments. 
  
What is of interest here is that by following the lead of the Conservative party, 
Labour forced some of its own MPs to vote against the party line creating more 
internal splits. Not only is Labour’s equivocation not transversal and may diminish 
the ability of the party, on the one hand, to act in unity and, on the other hand, to 
become the agent of a new inclusive, equalitarian discourse. Equivocation just 
means that you do not let the others define the terms within which you struggle. 
When you define the terms of the political game, you can define those you are 
struggling against – and define them up into a corner from where they cannot 
escape. 
 
As things stand, UKIP and the Conservatives are competing for Leave voters, and 
the Remain voters are left to the Liberal Democrats and the Greens. To be part of 
the competition, Labour needs to redefine the terms of the competition so that it is no 
longer a matter of leave or remain. Brexit needs either to be relegated to a 
secondary division or to be framed against the Conservative discourse. Although 
Labour still insists they will fight against the Conservative Brexit, it has not redefined 
Brexit. It just promises to oppose its more destructive terms at some future moment 
 
Conclusion: The Road Forward 
A populist left intervention does not happen in a vacuum. Conditions of 
dissatisfaction and hostility towards ‘the establishment’ enable new left parties to 
emerge as important contesters of power. When the links with the political system 
has been loosened, grassroots activity in the form of protests, movements and/or 
riots announce the distancing between ‘the people’ and the political system. If the 
demands of these activities are anti-systemic, but at the same time tangible and 
close to the everyday grievances of the people, they can potentially become serious 
contesters at parliamentary level. New left parties can become the embodiment of 
the ‘will of the people’ as long as it engages actively with grassroots activity, 
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attempts to draw new antagonistic frontiers which redefining the terms of the struggle 
and articulating diverse demands together anew. 
 
This is neither a simple nor an easy process. The conditions and the pre-existing 
social ruptures in each context may be more or less favourable. What is important, 
however, is – rather than following the examples of SYRIZA, Podemos and other left 
populist parties as instances offered for imitation – to engage with the underlined 
logics at play in order to be in a position to recognise the challenges (and the diverse 
reservoirs) available in each case.  
 
